When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Olaf Scholz, saw this as a “turning point” for Germany and Europe’s security policy. Until the start of the open invasion, Germany pursued a partnership-based policy of “change through trade” with Russia. This approach was intended to contain the former world power’s “imperial phantom pains” and sedate it in the long term. Germany’s cooperative security policy had to be upgraded for deterrence and defence against the aggressor. “Now five mandates for action lie ahead of us,” said the Chancellor in his “Zeitenwende” government statement, three days after the invasion: effective assistance for Ukraine; to dissuade the Putin regime from its course of war; secure NATO deterrence against Russia; a military renewal of the Bundeswehr; and Germany must also strengthen its global alliances and partnerships.

Germany’s military assistance is crucial for Ukraine

Germany has become an essential supporter of Ukraine. In terms of bilateral aid, it is in second place, behind the United States and ahead of the UK, according to the latest survey by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. The military part of the German assistance is particularly important. The Patriot and IRIS-T systems supplied by Germany and the Gepard anti-aircraft tanks are the basis of the Ukrainian air defence system. The armoured howitzer 2000 is an essential component of the artillery of the Ukrainian armed forces. The third focal point are the mechanised forces, where Germany provides Leopard 1 and 2 tanks, bridge-laying and mine-clearing systems as well as trucks for logistics. In addition, Germany is the central hub for training programmes via the EU and US forces for the Ukrainian Army. Recently, the Ukrainian shortage – especially in the German lead area of air defence – has worsened due to the consistent Russian warfare. Germany has launched the “Immediate Action on Air Defence” initiative to provide more systems.

However, Germany is a “one-eyed king in the land of the blind”. This is because the military assistance provided by the Western forces on the whole is inadequate compared to the needs of the Ukrainian defence forces. Ukraine communicated an annual requirement of three million artillery shells to the EU member states in 2023. The EU Commission estimates that the expansion of European production capacities will reach the two-million-mark in 2025. The remaining challenge for Europe, and therefore for Germany, is to increase the quantity of military assistance for Ukraine and to structure it better.

Since last autumn, Ukraine’s Western allies have been forming “competence coalitions” for this purpose. These alliances should develop the Ukrainian armed forces in the long term and standardise systems and their command, for example in the artillery corps. Germany co-leads the competence coalitions for air defence, mechanised forces and drones, and participates in those for artillery, maritime security, mine sweeping, and information technology. There is also the industry-driven approach of entering into joint ventures with the Ukrainian defence industry in order to strengthen its local armaments. One such joint venture was publicly presented in October 2023 in the presence of Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal. In the meantime, the first maintenance base under the umbrella of Rheinmetall Ukrainian Defence Industry LLC has commenced operations in the western Ukraine.

Russia continues to pursue the war

The second strand of the turning point, persuading Russia’s dictator Vladimir Putin to give up his war in Ukraine, has so far proved to be an unsuccessful endeavour. This is where the West’s massive sanctions should have had the greatest impact. Although they are a ballast for the Russian war effort, they are not taking it to a standstill, as had been hoped at the beginning of the war. Russia has completely converted its economy to armaments. It has increased its defence budget to a massive six percent of GDP this year. In spring, economist Andrei Beloussov became defence minister. His mission is to optimise Russia’s armaments in order to endure a long war.

The Western forces are also increasing their defence spending. Germany has caught up here. The Federal Republic only reached the target of two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for defence spending set by NATO in 2014 a decade later, namely this year – with the leverage of the €100 billion special funds for the Bundeswehr. Since the Vilnius Summit of the Alliance 2023, the two-percent target is no longer a goal, but a minimum expenditure. It remains to be seen whether Germany will be able to achieve this by expanding its defence budget. Almost all of the special funds are bound and are likely to be spent by 2027 at the latest. The most recent tax estimate expects significantly lower state revenues by then. It is remarkable that all departments are now using the security argument, regardless of whether they are fighting for savings or spending. Development Aid Minister Svenja Schulze (SPD), for example, resisted cuts to her budget by pointing out that development cooperation is important for security policy reasons. Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) positioned himself against a relaxation of the debt brake with the statement that “the financial resilience of the state is a factor of security”.

Pioneer in the development of large European battle groups

If you look at strand no. 3 of the turning point – the expansion of NATO deterrence against Russia – Germany is even leading the way. It is attempting to establish a European air defence via the Sky Shield initiative. The Bundeswehr is setting up Armoured Brigade 45 in Lithuania. This makes Germany, alongside Poland, the first of Europe’s military forces to take account of NATO’s New Force Model. It provides for a front defence of the eastern flank using large, combat-strong units. This is considered essential, especially with regard to the Baltic Alliance members, as they – unlike Ukraine – do not have the spatial depth to be able to intercept potential Russian attacks. Other central NATO forces, such as those of the UK and France, have only increased their deployment capacities on the eastern flank so far. Military self-empowerment is also part of the turning point for Germany and Europe with regard to the USA. So far, they have provided 70 percent of NATO’s capacities. The Republicans’ blockade attitude towards military assistance for Ukraine and a possible second Trump presidency shows how unpredictable the leadership and backing of Western supremacy has become.

With the complete integration of the Dutch army, the Bundeswehr has become the first army to create a basis for the development of large multinational battle groups in Europe. The forces that NATO considers to be necessary for effective defence cannot be formed on a purely national basis. The Alliance will increase its number of NATO corps from the current ten. All corps are to be supported by three divisions. The corps will be distributed across the planned NATO regions North, Centre, and South. Each corps will be under the command of a framework nation such as Germany.

The Lithuania brigade is therefore only a first contribution. Germany will have to do much more. NATO military planners expect more combat support and logistics at corps and division level. “Allies as Germany need to invest more here,” stated Angus Lapsley, NATO Deputy Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, to the author at the Munich Security Conference 2024. As chief of the German armed forces, the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Carsten Breuer, emphasised at the end of deployment exercise Quadriga 2024 (see graphic on p. 18) in Lithuania that the Bundeswehr must be ready for war by 2029.

Strengthening the Bundeswehr is still at the beginning

German armaments still lack the volume for a long-term upgrade of the Bundeswehr – the fourth strand of the turning point. Divisions 25 and 27 for NATO’s New Force Model will consist of large units sustained by the entire army by the end of the decade. The development of their mobile air defence for the battlefield has received its first element with the Skyranger procurement. Modern air defence must be particularly effective against drones. Their rise as a weapon of war is the military development of our time par excellence. However, the German forces do not have an armaments concept for drones in particular yet.

Artillery is once again proving to be the queen of battles in the Ukrainian war. The Bundeswehr has yet to modernise and expand it. The Bundes wehr’s military planners are still working on adapting the army’s skills profile. This means that in many areas there is only replacement procurement for material that is being sent to Ukraine. At the same time, Germany is successfully trying to acquire partner forces to arm themselves with joint equipment. One example is the Leopard 2 A8 framework contract, which is open to partners. This network armament, with a focus on smaller partners such as the Netherlands, Norway, and the Czech Republic, makes sense for the development of large European battle groups. However, this type of procurement is also fragmented and therefore time consuming.

Alongside material, personnel is the second major challenge in building a dependence army for NATO and EU partners as envisioned in Germany’s military concept for the Bundeswehr. Its target structure of 203,000 soldiers should be accomplished by the early 2030s. However, the increase has yet to materialise. The number of troops has stagnated for years at just over 180,000. How recruitment will be a success is a central part of the turning point debate in society and politics. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has recently publicly considered a new form of compulsory military service. Especially in order to reliably generate a large reserve again, Pistorius said in May 2024 at the parliamentary evening of the reservists’ association in Berlin. The Federal Minister of Defence finally proposed a reformed voluntary military service in June 2024. This is intended to reach out to all young people who are potentially eligible for military service through a compulsory questionnaire.

The opposition party CDU wants to temporarily reactivate the suspended compulsory military service if it regains power – as a contingent solution. This means that all young Germans in a certain year would be conscripted and the Bundeswehr would draw its requirements from this. In the long term, however, there should be a “compulsory year of service”. In such a concept, the focus is not on increasing the defensive potential, but on improving social resilience. Such a service can also be performed in other security-relevant areas such as civil protection and rescue services.

Overall defence as major construction site

The synergy between civil defence and military power, the overall defence, continues to be a major construction site of the turning point. According to the first national security strategy of 2023, Germany derives its military importance for NATO largely from its role as the “logistical hub of the Alliance”. Germany, at the heart of the continent, is the central hub for receiving forces and supplies for the eastern flank and distributing them forwards. This makes Germany an obvious target for Russian attacks in the event of war and already now for sabotage such as cyberattacks. In order to ensure the protection and supply of the population, investments would have to be made in infrastructure based on redundant technology, healthcare, and protection options. The federal states are demanding €10 billion from the federal government, spread over ten years. So far without success.

The federal government recently issued new framework guidelines for overall defence – the previous ones dated back to 1989. The enduring principle for overall defence is cooperative federalism, as in disaster control, where the federal and state governments ought to complement each other’s resources. What is new is the involvement of the private sector, which now operates a large part of the critical infrastructure (KRITIS), such as data centres and data networks in cyberspace. The directive obliges private operators of KRITIS to maintain “rapid response teams”. In this context, Lieutenant General André Bodemann, Commander of the Territorial Command of the German Armed Forces, always emphasises “that defence is a task for society as a whole”.

Together with the Bundeswehr, the Federal Office of Civil Protection has designed an “overall civil defence scenario” that simulates a fictitious attack by an aggressor on Germany and Europe – based on the experiences of the Ukrainian war. The conclusions drawn from this should renew the civil defence concept from 2016 by the end of the legislative period in 2025. In the meantime, the Bundeswehr has developed an “Operational Plan Germany” (OPLAN DEU) for the resilient deployment of troops in the event of war. A key part of this is the use of civilian resources such as refuelling stations and workshops by the Bundeswehr. The OPLAN will be tested for the first time in autumn 2024. It will be advantageous for the development of an overall defence that the appreciation of the military is visibly increasing in society. A striking example of this is the German national sport football, with Rheinmetall recently becoming a sponsor of Bundesliga team Borussia Dortmund. The decision sparked controversy. Federal Economics Minister and Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck stated: “The fact that Rheinmetall is now sponsoring a football club is indeed unusual, but it shows where we are today. We know and unfortunately have to admit that we are in a different, more threatening world.”

Difficult terrain: strengthening alliances worldwide

Putin’s aggression not only requires the expansion of Germany’s and Europe’s defence. Global alliances are part of it. The Ukrainian war is reinforcing the geopolitical dynamics of a bloc formation between the Western forces and an authoritarian camp centred around Russia and China. The latter’s economic power is the decisive factor in keeping Russia in its invasive war. China’s economy now substitutes a large proportion of the goods sanctioned by the West that are important for Russian armaments, such as electronic components. Germany must form and strengthen alliances worldwide to deprive the war leader Russia of resources and contain the war supporter China – strand no. 5 of the turning point. Germany is increasingly taking a security policy stance in the Indo-Pacific against China’s claim to dominance in the region. For example, it has been increasing naval and air force deployments to local partners such as Australia for several years. Australia has launched a comprehensive modernisation programme for its armed forces, with China in mind. An armaments alliance with Germany in the land sector is part of this programme. The army’s upcoming heavy weapon carrier, an 8×8 wheeled armoured vehicle from the Boxer family, will be produced in Australia by Rheinmetall. Such defence partnerships have previously been an ostracised tool for German foreign and security policy. In Asia, they are now foreseen to ensure that Germany remains an attractive ally for countries that have to encounter China – firstly mentioned in the German government’s Indo-Pacific guidelines of 2020. However, Germany’s economy has been geared towards the huge Chinese market for over three decades. The diversification away from China that politicians have been striving for under Chancellor Merkel is still in its infancy.

The Middle Kingdom also dominates trade with the countries of the Global South – with Asia, Africa, and South America. The Western forces now consider good and close relations with these countries to be crucial in order to maintain their rules-based world order. However, Germany’s trade with this group of countries has stagnated at 3.6% since 2010, according to an analysis by the Cologne Institute for Economic Research (ger. Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft IW). Russia, by contrast is expanding its economic relations with the global South. According to the IW, its share of the market recently stood at 2.4%, twice as high as before the start of the war. In Africa, the security policy of Germany and the Europeans has not only been weakened, but has collapsed. There is nothing left of the approach of stabilising the Sahel region by strengthening the military of regional partners and alliances. Germany wanted to maintain the last European outpost in this important region with the Niamey air base in Niger, but failed. The Europeans must now rebuild their commitment to Africa from scratch.

An overall view of Germany’s turning point in foreign and security policy shows that the Federal Chancellor’s five strands of action show progress, setbacks, and stagnation. The need to implement them is obvious and will continue to challenge future federal governments over the next decade.