General Brieger, how has the Ukrainian war affected European security policy?
The European Union as a whole has responded very quickly and sustainably to the Ukrainian war. The agreement of appropriate support of both a military and non-military nature, but also the imposition of sanctions, demonstrate this. As far as the member states are concerned, common decisions are the basis for the European Union to act accordingly. Hence, that is the fundamental agreement and the political will to work together. Meanwhile, the EU Commission has also presented a white paper on defence policy and launched the ‘Rearm Europe’ initiative.

Further challenges have arisen with the inauguration of President Donald Trump. How do you assess further co-operation between the United States and the European Union?
EEven before President Trump took office, it was already clear that the United States was shifting its security and defence focus more towards the Far East, with China identified as the primary strategic competitor. I actually see this kind of political development as an accelerator for European efforts. If the United States is reorienting its security posture to another region, and as a result its resources in Europe remain limited or may even be downsized, then Europeans will have to do more to meet their shared responsibilities. Put simply: we Europeans need to do more for European defence. We need to invest more, and we must do so as cooperatively as possible. These investments must take into account the military end-user perspective, which should play a central role in procurement decisions …, and we need to be able to implement this in the most unbureaucratic and timely manner possible.

What are the main security challenges the EU is facing?
Russia will continue to play a major role in threat assessments. Beyond that, the Western Balkans remain a key region for Europe – stability there cannot be taken for granted, and significant challenges persist. Moreover, Europe has re-focussed its strategic compass to a 360-degree approach. This means that crisis developments in Africa, particularly when linked to issues such as illegal migration, terrorism, or regional instability, must also be reflected within the Union’s crisis response mechanisms.

The exploitation of illegal migration, as we’ve seen, for example, by Belarus targeting Poland, is in fact a manifestation of hybrid warfare. In this spectrum, the lines between war and non-war become increasingly blurred. It is therefore crucial that decision-makers recognise we are already at war in certain domains. Just as we have to realize that constant cyberattacks on critical systems in Western societies are reality.

How do you assess China’s role from the EU’s point of view?
The relationship with China is multi-layered. Of course, China is and remains a partner in overcoming global crises. But China is also an economic competitor. And China is, to a certain extent, a rival, especially due to its system and society. We therefore need to take this complexity into account. It is about pursuing the right relationship with pragmatic solutions, but also considering the risks of China’s ascent and correctly categorising the military increase in capability of the Middle Kingdom. For Europe, however, Russia currently remains the largest risk.

How will the relationship between the EU and NATO be in the future?
There are only four EU member states left that are not also members of the Atlantic Alliance. The two institutions have a long-standing partnership and a large number of joint work programmes. It can be assumed that European armed forces associate with NATO standards, and that the capability goals are complementary or partially aligned. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the differences between the two organisations. Even though its military component has been given more attention recently, the European Union is a multifaceted political organisation. It can unfold a wide range of resources within its crisis management. NATO, as a military defence alliance, is focused on collective defence. What is new is that these two aspects are increasingly merging. The European Union, for instance, has Article 42(7), which commits member states to provide mutual support and assistance. This provision is legally comparable to NATO’s Article 5.

It is certainly essential for the European Union to take on the role of coordinator here. For example, the European Defence Agency is an organisation that should coordinate the various armaments efforts. The 27 EU defence ministers have agreed on capability goals. Twenty-two priorities have been identified, including air defence, counter measures against drones, military mobility, but also the medical service – large packages where a significant backlog has been recognised. The task now is to pursue these capability goals jointly and cooperatively, while avoiding overlaps as far as possible.

What would you wish for in the European armaments cooperation, where do you still see potential for optimisation?
Closing capability gaps is certainly a matter of funding, but equally a matter of coordination. I would like to see EU member states make greater use of the instruments available at the European level, particularly through joint procurement. This would not only help to reduce the current diversity of equipment, but also ensure that new materiel is delivered in a timely manner, and in the right quality and quantity. It’s also about securing these quantities within a relatively short timeframe in order to rapidly build up conventional defence capabilities.

If you now look at the various reforms of armed forces across EU member states – where do you see the greatest need for action?
The backlog is common to all European armed forces. After the end of the Cold War, we had a long phase of disarmament – the keyword being ‘peace dividend’. There were other priorities. And now we are confronted with a geopolitical turning point. The European member states must once again do more for defence, security and resilience and not just focus on crisis management outside Europe, but also on the territorial defence of the continent. This is actually the great change. All European armed forces are currently undergoing a transformation process with the aim of making the necessary adjustments.

What role does the defence industry play in European security policy? To what extent would further consolidation of the European defence industry make sense?
The defence industry plays a very important role, especially in times of great backlog demand. Your company, Rheinmetall, is playing a prominent role here, alongside others. But cooperation with suppliers, as well as with small and medium-sized companies also matters in terms of the value chain. Defence procurement should take place in a balanced European and regional framework.

Since every war is undoubtedly an absolute accelerator of military-technological development, we are facing the challenge of having to prepare for tomorrow’s war, not today’s. We have to anticipate. The military therefore expects the defence industry to take the end-user perspective into account. And to deliver the products that we have identified as being needed in the future.

As I see it, the European Commission is already striving for further consolidation of the defence industry – in the sense of better networking. Greater harmonisation and standardisation would be desirable. This would reduce the variety of equipment. Several players could be involved in production, and defence equipment would be available faster. It would also make sense to reduce our dependencies.

General, is there any special message that you would like to share with our readers?
What we need in the future is a ‘European spirit’. We can take pride in what we have achieved and face the challenges ahead with self-confidence. A united Europe is a unique project and a very respectable success story so far. It is important to carry that success forward with determination.

The interview was conducted by Jan-Phillipp Weisswange.